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ABSTRACT
There is a limited study on banking institution in Malaysia, especially the 
ones related to the corporate governance reporting of banks. The main 
objective of this study is to develop the Malaysian Bank Governance 
Reporting Score (MBGRS) for banking institutions in Malaysia. In these 
recent years, Bank Negara Malaysia has issued guidelines on corporate 
governance for banking institutions. Thus, it leads to the development of 
bank governance reporting score in order to measure the commitment of 
bank towards corporate governance. The overall finding of bank governance 
reporting score revealed that there is a lack of reporting in areas such as 
Board Structures, Duties and Effectiveness, Accountability and Audit, and 
Shareholder Rights. The findings provide a signal to identify the lack of 
area for the improvement in corporate governance of the banking sector 
in Malaysia.
Keywords: corporate governance, corporate reporting, disclosure, banking 
institution, BNM guidelines
introDuction
The bank governance reporting score is an indicator on which an organization 
or a firm follows the guideline and code of corporate governance practices 
(Darmadi, 2011). Good corporate governance practices are indicated by 
the division of rights and responsibilities among the board, stakeholders, 
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shareholders, management section and the rules established and followed to 
make decisions on corporate affairs. The evaluation of corporate governance 
practices through the reporting score is important for banks, especially for 
their depositors, investors and stakeholders. The reporting scores represent 
the disclosure of the bank’s information about their operations. 
According to Darmadi (2011), the way to reduce the lack of 
information is by increasing the corporate disclosure and transparency. 
The detailed knowledge about the bank’s operations may provide specific 
information that may affect managers, shareholders and other consumer 
groups to their economic decisions. Pursuant to Andres and Vallelado (2008), 
the corporate governance mechanism, especially the role of the boards, 
plays an important part in the banking business, which is more complex 
compared to other types of companies due to the extraordinary significance 
in respect of the structure of restricted rivalry, exceptional regulation, and 
higher asymmetry. The reason that bank governance is special is due to 
the manager’s responsibilities to monitor, manage and protect the funds 
obtained from various parties, such as depositors. 
According to Jha and Hui (2012), banks have the capacity to experience 
a quick catastrophe, in a manner that is not instantly visible to directors 
or outside investors. Banks are also multi-constituency organizations 
and have more stakeholders than non-financial firms. Thus, the banking 
institutions are more complicated than ordinary companies, in that they 
manage a large population that contributes funds to their banks and must 
always be transparent to their stakeholders. Becht, Bolton and Roell (2012) 
mentioned that the bondholders and depositors contribute almost all of the 
capital and additionally, most of the decisions are handled by the boards, 
managers and shareholders of the banks. Based on Marcinkowska (2012), 
a bank’s inability to adopt decent corporate governance practices may lead 
to the degradation of the bank. This becomes more hazardous when a bank 
is distrusted by its stakeholders.
Therefore, the corporate governance of banks should be evaluated 
differently by using typical variables that suit the banking institutions. The 
method that is frequently used by recent researchers is to develop corporate 
governance reporting scores of banks. Annual report is one of the important 
tools in delivering the corporate message and displays the image of their 
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effectiveness to the public. However, based on the study done by O’Sullivan, 
Percy and Stewart (2008), information about the firms should not only 
be served by annual report, but a good firm with high quality disclosure 
will make sure that all vital messages are included in their annual report. 
Therefore, the bank’s disclosure in the corporate governance part is essential 
to fulfill the main objective of this study which is to develop a specific bank 
governance reporting score for banking institutions in Malaysia. 
literature revieW
As a special type of firm, the corporate governance of bank requires special 
attention. Darmadi (2011) agreed that in assessing the credibility of financial 
information, knowledge about the governance structure of the firm is very 
useful to set fixed expectations and also to reduce the uncertainty about the 
performance of the firm. Based on Bushman, Piotroski and Smith (2004), 
the disclosure of corporate governance shows the responsibility of the 
people in governing the firm, the efficiency of compensation structured and 
how wise they invest the financial resources of the firm. Ibrahim (2011) 
suggested that corporate governance scores enable stakeholders to compare 
and understand the way companies operate and how management treats 
the interests of shareholders and also obtain additional information when 
making investment decisions.
Additionally, the banks can also get benefit from the scores especially 
as a benchmark for internal improvement, by benchmarking their current 
governance practices against global best practices. The firm’s stakeholder 
may not be able to get the information if the governance features are 
not disclosed, especially for the banking sector. Disclosure in corporate 
governance of banks seems to become more important as compared to 
other types of firms. This is due to the banking institutions that have high-
regulated features, which are subjected specifically to the banking authority.
The model and indicators for corporate governance scores developed 
in this study are adapted from the best corporate governance practices from 
both national and international studies. Additionally, most of the factors are 
taken from Guidelines on Corporate Governance of Licensed Institution 
issued by Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM, 2011). The issued guidelines are 
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based on Sections 56, 57 and 126 in the Banking and Financial Institution 
Act 1989 (BAFIA). Based on Section 126 in BAFIA, all guidelines, circulars 
or notes issued by Central Bank or Minister should be considered. 
The guidelines are in tune with the other guidelines such as the revised 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2007 (MCCG, 2007) and 
Enhancing Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations (BIS, 2010). 
However, some principles have been revised in accordance to the Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance 2012 in order to emphasize certain new 
aspects that are featured. Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2012 
highlighted the issue on reinforcing board structure and composition in 
perceiving the part of directors as dynamic and dependable fiduciaries. There 
are the differences between the MBGRS checklist and corporate governance 
for non-financial institutions. The Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group 
(MSWG) has developed the corporate governance index for all listed 
companies in Malaysia including banking institutions. The index used 
Yes/No answers as a method to measure their corporate governance score, 
which is different from this study where a Rubric scale is used for scoring. 
Almost 90 percent of the questions were developed using the 
Guidelines on Corporate Governance for Licensed Institutions (2011) issued 
by Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM, 2011) because they are specific to the 
banking sector. The critical attributes that bank governance should present 
are accountability and audit, shareholder rights and risk management. 
This is because the items are related to the audit committee whereas under 
the attribute of accountability and audit, it provides direction as well as 
supervises the operation of the total audit function for the bank. In terms 
of shareholder rights, this attribute represents the transparency of banks 
towards their investors, especially the declaration of dividend and shares. 
Risk management is also one of the important attributes in the corporate 
governance score of banks. Banks should have a good risk management 
framework to observe the policy and strategy to integrate risk, especially 
the market risk, credit risk and operational risk, in order to avoid being 
affected by a financial crisis. 
Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) released the Risk Governance 
Guidelines in 2013 that are applicable to all institutions authorized under 
the Islamic Banking Act 1983 (IBA), Banking and Financial Institutions 
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Act 1989 (BAFIA), Takaful Act 1984 (TA), Insurance Act 1996 (IA) 
and Development Financial Institutions Act 2002 (DFIA). Generally, 
these guidelines should be read along with the Guidelines on Corporate 
Governance for Licensed Institutions (2011); however, this study did not 
include the Risk Governance Guidelines in year 2013 as the period of study 
only covered from 2008 to 2012. Risk management is very important in 
financial institutions compared to non-financial institutions, in which a 
sound risk management framework should be achieved to compete with 
the increasingly complex business operations and activities in financial 
institutions. The corporate governance model in this study is based on the 
information disclosed by the banks to the public. The ultimate objective of 
the Malaysian Bank Governance Reporting Score (MBGRS) is to encourage 
the banks to comply their corporate governance practices with statutory 
regulation. 
banK governance attributes
Bank governance scores were measured based on both domestic and 
international guidelines. The main sources for choosing the bank 
governance attributes were the Bank Negara Malaysia Guidelines (BNM, 
2011); the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2007 (MCCG, 
2007) and the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance 2012 (MCCG, 
2012); the Guidelines on “Enhancing Corporate Governance for banking 
Organizations” (BIS, 2010); “Corporate Governance Guide: Towards 
Boardroom Excellence” Bursa Malaysia (BM, 2008); “A Practical Guide 
to Listing on Bursa Malaysia” Bursa Malaysia (BM, 2011); “The Green 
Book: Enhancing Board Effectiveness” Putrajaya Committee on GLC 
High Performance (PCG, 2006) and “Corporate Governance, Ownership 
and Bank Performance in Emerging Markets: Evidence from Russia and 
Ukraine” (Love & Rachinsky, 2006).  
The study also reviewed the practices of corporate governance 
internationally in accordance with the banking situation in Malaysia. A 
three-point Rubric scale was used to assess the corporate governance 
attributes in which the highest score of “3 points” shows the highest level 
of compliance while “0 points” represents a low score or non-compliance. 
The weighting of each attribute denotes their important character towards 
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corporate governance. Thus, this study classified the attributes into five 
major groups as follows: (i) Board Structures, Duties and Effectiveness; 
(ii) Directors Remuneration; (iii) Risk Management; (iv) Accountability
and Audit; (v) Shareholder Rights.
boarD structures, Duties anD effectiveness
This attribute was developed based on the Corporate Governance Guide 
by Bursa Malaysia and Bank Negara Malaysia. It includes twenty-three 
questions from this category, which combines the element of board 
responsibilities, board leadership and competencies, board size, conduct 
of board meetings, access to information, the role of company secretary, 
board committees, business ethics, corporate social responsibilities and 
strategic plan, etc. In respect of board effectiveness, the additional elements 
such as nominating committee, composition, training and performance 
evaluation are required. Sound corporate governance needs to exercise sound 
objective judgment, keep up proper capabilities and skill in individually 
and collectively.
Bank Negara Malaysia guidelines consist of a wide standard 
principles to deal with board matters and management oversight, and 
emphasize board responsibility, composition, meetings, performance and 
committees. Under the board responsibilities, a clear separation between the 
roles and responsibilities of the Chairman and the CEO (Chief Executive 
Officer) should be practiced by the bank to ensure that the roles and 
responsibilities given are appropriate and proportionate to their jurisdiction 
and accountability, respectively. The main disadvantage of CEO duality is 
the negative impact on the monitoring activity of the board that influences 
the decisions when managerial power is increased. In addition, CEOs who 
are also the Chairman will have a strong influence in the selection of board 
members and could further limit the dissemination of information to other 
board members (Haan & Vlahu, 2013). 
The other important element in this category is board expertise and 
training, performance evaluation, corporate social responsibilities and also 
awards obtained. This element actually shows that directors must be a high 
caliber person who can devote the time and commitment to their duties with 
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high credibility and integrity in line with their skills and experience required. 
Corporate social responsibility must be disclosed in details, especially in 
the environment, community, marketplace and workplace. Additionally, the 
award obtained shows that the bank is excellent in corporate governance 
practices and has gained recognition. Thus, the bank who gains the award 
could give bonus points to their score. This category aims to investigate the 
board effectiveness and practices of corporate governance in the company.
Directors remuneration
An effective remuneration committee can bring significant benefits to 
the company if it is properly established and operated by the appropriate 
personnel. The remuneration committee should ensure that all of the 
directors and senior management are rewarded equally based on their 
performance and contribution to the company as a whole (BM, 2008). The 
purpose of this section is to clarify the remuneration policy transparently for 
the directors, CEOs and senior management officers in order to ensure that 
the compensation given is in line with the culture, strategy and objectives 
of the banking institutions. The increase of responsibilities and expectations 
of directors must be parallel to the level of remuneration, especially to 
the responsibilities undertaken and the contribution to the company. 
Additionally, the remuneration must also take into account the director’s 
experience and expertise, which contributes to the effectiveness of the board.
risK management
Risk management is the most important part in business, especially in the 
banking sector. The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2012) 
also highlights a sound risk management, through which the board should 
monitor and determine the level of risk for assessing the risk of the 
company’s business in detail in order to protect investors and shareholders 
by ensuring that the risk management processes are implemented. Based 
on the Bank Negara Malaysia Guidelines (BNM, 2011), the banks should 
include an explanation of the nature of risk, methods, assessment and the 
frequency of any review conducted by the institutions to represent the 
effectiveness of the risk management system.
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Understanding and managing risks are critical for protecting the 
company’s value, which is highlighted in “The Green Book: Enhancing 
Board Effectiveness” created by Putrajaya Committee on GLC High 
Performance (PCG, 2006). The board has three specific roles – understanding 
the major risk exposure that could increase the possibility of company 
failure, setting the parameter of company’s risk and considering the risk 
factor in all major decisions. To avoid the risk caused by the failure of 
business, the board should manage risks well and remain focused on the 
company’s principal risk.
accountability anD auDit
This category is based on the attributes developed in the Bank Negara 
Malaysia guidelines (2011). One of the responsibilities of the board of 
directors is to be directly accountable to the shareholder of the firms (Haat, 
2006). The primary oversight of accountability and audit lies with the Audit 
Committee. The Audit Committee plays an important role in assisting 
the board with its financial monitoring and reporting responsibilities and 
ensuring the independence of the company’s auditor. In addition, Love 
and Rachinsky (2006) highlighted the internal and external audit, which 
is important under this category. Appropriate disclosure is needed so that 
shareholders, stakeholders and market participants can effectively gain an 
understanding of the financial position and the company’s management.
shareholDer rights
Shareholders contribute to the activities of the bank and enjoy many rights, 
such as voting rights at the Annual General Meeting (AGM), dividend 
policy, share rights and other related information. The AGM is an important 
mechanism for communicating with the shareholder because it gives the 
public direct access to the board and the opportunity to express their views 
in relation to the bank. The communication policy should be maintained 
by the board in order to communicate with their shareholders, stakeholders 
and public effectively, either through disclosure in annual reports or AGM 
(BNM, 2011).
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methoDology
sample selection
This study seeks to evaluate the performance of foreign and domestic 
banks in Malaysia, which are comprised of commercial banks, Islamic 
banks, International Islamic banks, and investment banks. At present, a 
total of 65 banks including domestic and foreign banks are operating in 
Malaysia. However, the sample for this study only included 35 banks 
with the available financial data covering the period of 2008-2012 (161 
observations) because of the unavailability of annual reports due to some 
banks that are newly operated in Malaysia.
Data collection
The source of data in this study is a secondary data adopting the content 
analysis approach. The data of this study were taken from the compilation 
of information from the bank’s annual reports. Other useful sources of data 
used in this study are from Bank Negara Malaysia publications and internet 
websites. This study involved the analysis of five years of annual reports 
of 35 banks from 2008 to 2012. 
measurement
The reporting score was measured based on the attributes provided 
in the guidelines by Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (MCCG), Corporate Governance Guide Bursa 
Malaysia, Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) and other 
international best practices. This study evaluated the data by using 
assessment questionnaire based on zero-to-three point of Rubric scale which 
was also used by Ariff (2011) and Palmer (2008). According to Ibrahim 
(2011) and Wanyama and Olweny (2013), Rubric scale is the best technique 
used in the attitude measurement because the scales are easiest to construct 
and based on assumption, the scale has equal attitudinal weight which 
reflects the attitude towards the issue in question. The scores given from 
the scale is 0 to 3 which is based on the information provided in the annual 
report. Greater specificity of information means greater quality scores. Thus, 
the corporate governance disclosure of this study was measured using the 
following ranges:
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0  = Applies when it discloses minimal information of corporate 
governance 
1 = Applies when the sentence only discloses certain guidelines of 
corporate governance in the annual report.
2 = Applies when the sentence meets the requirements of the 
corporate governance guidelines in the annual report.
3 = Applies when the sentence gives details about the corporate 
governance guidelines in the annual report with additional 
information.
results
test on reliability of scale
Reliability is the extent to which measures are tested and produce 
consistent results. Measurement errors that affect reliability are random 
errors. As this study implemented the corporate governance score of 
banks, the reliability test should be performed to prove that the study 
is free from random errors and internal consistency. Wells and Wollack 
(2003) emphasised that the most popular statistics in measuring the internal 
consistency is referred to as Cronbach’s alpha. According to Eisinga, 
Grotenhuis, and Pelzer (2012), Cronbach’s alpha is an accurate estimate 
of reliability under rather restrictive assumptions. Cronbach’s alpha ranges 
from 0 to 1.00 whereby values close to 1.00 indicate high consistency.
In addition, professionally developed high-stakes standardised 
tests should have internal consistency coefficients of at least 0.9 (Wells 
& Wollack, 2003). However, Nunnally (1978) indicated that 0.7 is an 
acceptable reliability coefficient. This study used STATA for the MBGRS 
that had five attributes and 50 items in total. Based on the result of the 
reliability test in Table 1, the Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient was 0.969 and 
is thus above the 0.7 minimum level as recommended by Nunnally (1978) 
and Wells and Wollack (2003).
219
Developing a Corporate governanCe reporting SCore
table 1: results for reliability test on mbgrs
N = 50
Cronbach’s Alpha = 0.969
Cronbach’s Alpha Based on Standardized Items = 0.971
item item testcorrelation
item rest
correlation
average interim 
correlation
cronbach’s 
alpha
Attribute 1
a) 0.7511 0.7371 0.4017 0.9705
b) 0.7408 0.7264 0.4020 0.9705
c) 0.6069 0.5868 0.4056 0.9710
d) 0.4680 0.4433 0.4094 0.9714
e) 0.6040 0.5838 0.4057 0.9710
f) 0.6655 0.6477 0.4040 0.9708
g) 0.2866 0.2578 0.4144 0.9720
h) 0.4844 0.4602 0.4090 0.9714
i) 0.0672 0.0362 0.4204 0.9726
j) 0.6395 0.6207 0.4047 0.9709
k) 0.3512 0.3236 0.4126 0.9718
l) 0.7842 0.7718 0.4008 0.9704
m) 0.7154 0.6997 0.4027 0.9706
n) 0.7539 0.7400 0.4016 0.9705
o) 0.6842 0.6672 0.4035 0.9707
p) 0.6381 0.6192 0.4048 0.9709
q) 0.4253 0.3995 0.4106 0.9715
r) 0.7416 0.7271 0.4019 0.9705
s) 0.6118 0.5919 0.4055 0.9709
t) 0.5494 0.5272 0.4072 0.9711
u) 0.7796 0.7670 0.4009 0.9704
v) 0.7728 0.7599 0.4011 0.9704
w) 0.8065 0.7952 0.4002 0.9703
Attribute 2
a) 0.6891 0.6723 0.4034 0.9707
b) 0.6723 0.6548 0.4038 0.9708
c) 0.5309 0.5081 0.4077 0.9712
d) 0.7997 0.7881 0.4003 0.9703
220
malaysian accounting review, volume 15 no. 2, 2016
Attribute 3
a) 0.5879 0.5671 0.4062 0.9710
b) 0.6863 0.6694 0.4035 0.9707
c) 0.3862 0.3593 0.4117 0.9717
d) 0.6139 0.5941 0.4054 0.9709
Attribute 4
a) 0.4228 0.3969 0.4107 0.9715
b) 0.6120 0.5921 0.4055 0.9709
c) 0.6599 0.6418 0.4042 0.9708
d) 0.7130 0.6973 0.4027 0.9706
e) 0.7500 0.7359 0.4017 0.9705
f) 0.8442 0.8350 0.3991 0.9702
g) 0.738 0.7233 0.402 0.9705
h) 0.6784 0.6611 0.4037 0.9707
i) 0.5958 0.5753 0.4059 0.9710
j) 0.6796 0.6624 0.4036 0.9707
Attribute 5
a) 0.7608 0.7472 0.4014 0.9705
b) 0.7402 0.7257 0.4020 0.9705
c) 0.8439 0.8346 0.3991 0.9702
d) 0.7681 0.7549 0.4012 0.9704
e) 0.6190 0.5993 0.4053 0.9709
f) 0.6366 0.6177 0.4048 0.9709
g) 0.7336 0.7187 0.4022 0.9706
h) 0.8334 0.8235 0.3994 0.9702
i) 0.7441 0.7297 0.4019 0.9705
overall scores
Table 2 presents the composition of MBGRS. The MBGRS comprised 
of 50 items representing five major sections. For each item, a score of 
“3” was the highest score given when the bank complied and disclosed 
details of such compliance accordingly. If an item was not disclosed or 
only disclosed the minimum information, it was marked as “0”. Table 1 
illustrates the weights attached to the major sections of the score towards 
the overall MBGRS. The highest weighted 46 percent of this score is from 
the board structures, and duties and effectiveness, while accountability and 
audit represents 20 percent of the weighted scores.
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table 2: composition of the mbgrs
major section of bank governance score items total raw score Weights
Board Structures, Duties and Effectiveness 23 69 46
Directors Remuneration 4 12 8
Risk Management 4 12 8
Accountability and Audit 9 30 20
Shareholder Rights 10 27 18
total 50 150 100%
Based on the summary statistics in Table 3, the sample size of this 
score is 35 banks and the maximum score obtained is 134 points out of 150, 
which is equivalent to 89.33 percent. The banks obtained 59.18 (or 39.45 
percent) of MBGRS raw score on mean. However, the minimum score 
obtained is 3 (or 2 percent) of the total 150 points. It showed a very low 
minimum score for a banking institution which should be more transparent 
in disclosing information in the annual report. The score comes from the 
foreign bank of Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation Malaysia Berhad 
which originates from Tokyo, Japan. Perhaps it has a good disclosure on 
corporate governance in Japan but for the annual report in Malaysia, the 
bank only have little disclosure on corporate governance. The summary 
statistics of Bank Governance Score for five years period are as follow: 
table 3: summary statistics of bank governance score
item overall value
Sample Size 35
Maximum Score 134
Minimum Score 3
Mean 59.18
Standard Deviation 30.32
Median 54
Since Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation Malaysia Berhad 
is newly operated in Malaysia, the bank may actually be in the process 
of finalizing their annual report, especially in the section of corporate 
governance. Meanwhile, the midpoint of the score is 54 (or 36 percent). 
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This indicates that there are banks in Malaysia with possibly low levels 
of practiced corporate governance. The minimum score is very low and 
resulted from a foreign bank that is newly operated in Malaysia. Therefore, 
the high gap between the minimum and maximum scores shows that the 
lack of banks in disclosing the best practice of corporate governance are 
obvious and should be improved. Figure 1 demonstrates the mean score of 
MBGRS from 2008 to 2012.
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The chart shows that the score increases uniformly from 2008 to 
2010. The Malaysian Corporate Governance R port (2010) published by 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) also revealed the upward 
graph for three years (2008-2010). This demonstrat  the continuing 
commitment shown by banks towards achieving the requirements of 
corporate governance. However, the mean scores decreased in 2011, 
reflecting the i creased number of banks embracing the recommended 
corporate governance best practices, but perhaps at a slower pace to adapt 
to the guidelines needed. Therefore, there should not be any room for 
complacency as there are opportuniti s for improvement. The decline in the 
mean scores for 2011 is due to the inclusion of several new foreign banks 
in Malaysia since Bank Negara Malaysia has announced the issuance of 
new commercial bank lice ses on 27 April 2009.
Three new foreign banks have been newly operated in Malaysia in 
2011. Thus, the low score obtained are due to the newcomers in the industry 
that presents severe disclosure. Additionally, certain banks are possibly in 
the phase of updating their annual reports to meet the required guidelines 
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set by Bank Negara Malaysia Guidelines for Licensed Institutions (BNM, 
2011). However, it is noted that the mean score in 2011 is higher than the 
mean score in 2009. The surge of the scores from the 2011 to 2012 shows 
that the banks were motivated to improve the corporate governance best 
practices as recommended. 
Table 4 presents the statistics of MBGRS for 2011 based on the sample 
of 35 banks with the maximum score of 131 and minimum score of 3 points. 
The average score is 58.23 of the total points of 150, which is 33.27 percent. 
In 2012, the maximum score increases to 134 and the minimum score is 
8. Additionally, the mean score also increases to 62.03 (35.44 percent). It
indicates that the corporate governance score is increased from 2011 to 2012.
table 4: summary statistics of mbgrs for 35 banks (2011 and 2012)
item
overall value
2011 2012
Sample Size 35 35
Maximum Score 131 134
Minimum Score 3 8
Mean 58.23 62.03
Figure 2 is the distribution of MBG raw scores for 35 banks in 2012. 
The chart shows that the higher the score, the less the number of banks, 
and indicates that only a few banks have earned high scores. Additionally, 
most of the scores are clustered in 40 (26.67 percent) and 60 (40 percent) 
which reflects that there is much space for improvement in the reporting of 
Malaysian banks on their corporate governance practices. 
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Table 5 presents the mean percentage for each attribute of MBGRS for 
the period of 2008 to 2012. Based on Table 4, the scores of Board Structures, 
Duties, and Effectiveness, Directors Remuneration, and Accountability 
and Audit are nearly 50 percent. The attribute that scores below 50 percent 
is Shareholder Rights. The unsatisfactory score indicates that banks do 
not meet the required guidelines. This shows that the banking sector in 
Malaysia is not sufficiently focused on the importance of disclosure, though 
it is important to be transparent to their shareholders, stakeholders, and 
depositors.
table 5: mean percentage of mbgrs
no. bank governance attributes max.score
mean raw 
score
mean percentage 
score
1. Board Structures, Duties and Effectiveness 59 29.07 42.13
2. Directors Remuneration 12 5.95 49.6
3. Risk Management 12 6.32 52.7*
4. Accountability and Audit 27 12.44 41.47
5. Shareholder Rights 27 5.25 19.4
* Higher than 50% 
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Table 6 shows the difference between the mean percentage score in 
2011 and 2012. Generally, the mean percentage score in 2012 has obtained 
a better result as compared to the mean percentage score in 2011 for each 
attributes. This might be due to improvement in the annual report by the 
banks in Malaysia that is based on the Guidelines of Corporate Governance 
of Licensed Institution issued in 2011. Meanwhile, the score for risk 
management is similar for both years. The lowest mean percentage score 
can be seen in shareholder rights for 2011 and 2012, which is 18.41 percent 
and 21.50 percent, respectively. This shows that the attribute of shareholder 
rights has obtained an unsatisfactory score in 2011 and 2012. Thus, it can 
be said that the banking sector in Malaysia has ineffective communication 
policies with poor disclosure practices. The banking sector in Malaysia 
still lacks transparency to their shareholders and stakeholders as well as 
depositors, perhaps in order to conceal their underperformance with most 
banks with the lower score on this attribute being small. 
table 6: mean percentage of mbgrs (2011 and 2012)
no. bank governance attributes
mean percentage score
2011 2012
1. Board Structures, Duties and Effectiveness 40.94 44.14
2. Directors Remuneration 51.67* 54.30*
3. Risk Management 55.00* 55.00*
4. Accountability and Audit 41.53 42.20
5. Shareholder Rights 18.41 21.50
The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG, 2012) and 
the Guidelines of Corporate Governance of Licensed Institution (BNM, 
2011) emphasise a sound framework of risk management. Therefore, risk 
management attributes ranked the highest, possibly due to their focus on the 
guidelines. However, the score of board structures, duties, and effectiveness, 
director’s remuneration, and accountability and audit differed little from 
risk management. This portrays that the banking sector in Malaysia has a 
good disclosure on the attributes as they scored above 50 percent and are 
similar in scores. In addition, the banking sector is bound to the BAFIA 
as compulsory guidelines, especially related to the attributes of board 
structures, duties and effectiveness, and accountability and audit. 
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Discussion anD conclusion
The attributes have been measured to reveal their contribution and 
importance for the bank governance scores in this study. Higher weight 
scores prove that the guideline requirements have been met by the banks. 
The results showed that efforts by the banks have thus far produced the 
desired outcomes and represent a commitment and willingness on the part 
of the banks to enhance their corporate governance practices. It is parallel 
to the objective of Bank Negara Malaysia to encourage the banking sector 
in Malaysia in reporting the corporate governance by adopting either 
international or local best practices.
Table 6 lists the top ten banks that scored more than 50 percent. The 
highest weighted score is Public Bank Berhad, followed by CIMB Bank, 
Malayan Banking Berhad, AmBank (M) Berhad, and Hong Leong Bank 
Berhad. It is worth noting that Public Bank Berhad has scored the highest 
for corporate governance since 2008 and has been awarded the best bank 
awards and excellence in corporate governance by national and international 
publications in 2011 and 2012.
table 6: mean percentage of mbgrs
rank name of bank Weighted score (%)
1. Public Bank 89.3
2. CIMB Bank 82.0
3. Malayan Banking 80.0
4. AmBank 70.7
5. Hong Leong Bank 66.0
6. Kenanga Investment Bank 65.3
7. RHB Bank 62.7
8. Alliance Bank Malaysia 62.0
9. Affin Bank 58.0
10. Bank Muamalat Malaysia 51.3
Evidence of improved corporate governance performance should 
motivate other banks. The other five banks which are Kenanga Investment 
Bank Berhad, RHB Bank Berhad, Alliance Bank Malaysia Berhad, Affin 
Bank Berhad, and Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad were also committed 
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to disclosing their corporate governance report to compete with other banks, 
especially Kenanga Investment Bank Berhad and Bank Muamalat Malaysia 
Berhad. Kenanga Investment Bank Berhad was ranked ninth in 2011 and 
ranked sixth in the 2012 while Bank Muamalat Malaysia Berhad ranked 
eleventh in 2011, competing with Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad and was 
ranked tenth in 2012.
Findings from this study suggest that the banking sector in Malaysia 
has ineffective communication policies with poor disclosure practices. The 
banking sector in Malaysia still lacks transparency to their shareholders 
and stakeholders as well as depositors, perhaps in order to conceal their 
underperformance with most banks with the lower score on this attribute 
being small. The Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG, 2012) 
and the Guidelines of Corporate Governance of Licensed Institution (BNM, 
2011) emphasise a sound framework for risk management. Therefore, risk 
management attributes ranked the highest, possibly due to their focus on the 
guidelines. However, the score of board structures, duties, and effectiveness, 
director’s remuneration, and accountability and audit differed little from 
risk management. This portrays that the banking sector in Malaysia has a 
good disclosure on the attributes as they scored above 50 percent and are 
similar in scores. In addition, the banking sector is bound to the BAFIA 
as compulsory guidelines, especially in relation to the attributes of board 
structures, duties and effectiveness, and accountability and audit.
Banking institutions should have better transparency towards the 
shareholders as well as depositors. Adeyemi and Olowu (2013) also reported 
that banks disclose inadequate information and that low transparency leads to 
obtaining a low overall score for bank performance. According to Muttakin 
and Ullah (2012), better corporate governance is important to the banking 
sector, which encourages the interests of investors and other stakeholders 
in the bank, while, based on Nworji, Adebayo and David (2011), banks 
that provide weak protection for their investors have worse corporate 
governance. Therefore, the banking sector in Malaysia should improve 
its corporate governance with respect to high quality disclosure through 
accountability and audit and better transparency, especially in respect 
of shareholder rights. This will enable them to achieve sound corporate 
governance disclosure as well as to ensure that the interests of depositors 
and creditors are adequately protected. 
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The overall findings of bank governance score in this study have 
provided a signal for banks in Malaysia to identify their lacking area the 
improvement. As reported in this study, the bank governance score reveals 
that the reporting is lacking in areas such as Board Structures, Duties and 
Effectiveness, Accountability and Audit, and Shareholder Rights. This study 
gives further guideline for banks to improve their corporate governance by 
virtue of the recommendation by the Corporate Governance Blueprint, the 
new and revised code that is previously mentioned. The limitation of this 
study is the annual report for several banks, especially for foreign banks, 
is not complete and the information required has to be obtained from their 
websites. Additionally, since the study evaluated the board of directors of 
the bank, the intermediaries’ banks such as CIMB Islamic Bank and CIMB 
Investment Bank are led by the same people or board of directors with the 
commercial bank of CIMB Bank. Thus, the intermediary banks cannot be 
included for the evaluation as the result will become similar when measuring 
their corporate governance reporting, especially in the part of information 
on the board of directors.
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